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Although no specific provision of the E.E.C. Treaty decrees supremacy
of the Community's legal order over the legal orders of the Member States,
it is the assumed consensus that the Common Market is a supra-national
organization and that its law is supreme. Regulation 17 offers the clue; its
Article 3 vests the Commission with authority to apply Article 85, and its
Article 9 authorizes the Member States to declare an agreement invalid
under Article 85(1), even though the agreement would be valid under
national law.1
National courts were forced to concede that Community law must be
divorced from, and be independent of, the law of the Member States, and
also that it created rights which had become part of their national laws.
This concession recognized that "the Community constitutes a new legal
order of international law for the benefit of which states have restricted
their sovereign power in specified limited areas and whose subjects are not
only the member states but their nationals as well." 2 Inexorably, therefore,
this was followed by a decision holding that treaty rights must be given
precedence over any conflicting national law. 3
The Court of Justice first had occasion to express its views in Grun-
dig-Consten. In that case it held that, in any conflict between national law
and Common Market law, treaty law must prevail. Thus, the path was
opened for the authorities of the E.E.C. to develop a treaty law in-
dependent of the cartel traditions of Member States: "Even in the absence
*LL.D., Univ, of Freiburg (Germany) 1919; LL.D., Harvard Law School. 1939; Honor-
ary Professor of Law, Univ. of Cologne (Germany), 1959; presently Counsel to the firm of
Golenbock and Barell, New York City.
tThis article was prompted by the author's study of the six volumes edited by Professor
Dr. Eugen Ulmer, bearing the same title (Das Recht des Unlauteren Wettbewerbs in den
Mitgliedsstaaten der Europaeischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft).
'Regulation 17, Article 9. See the Dutch Grundig opinion of the Hague Court of Appeals
of 1963. Jacobus Kadee v. Grundig (Nederland) N.V.. 1965 CoMM. MKT. L. REP., p. 40.2Van Gend & Loos c. L'administration fiscale Nederlandaise, Court of Justice Case No,
26/62, CCH COMM. MKT. REP., Ct. Dec. 8008.3Costa v. E.N.E.L., Case No. 6/64, CCH COMM. MKT. REP., Ct. Dec. 8023.
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of an explicit statement of treaty supremacy, and even before coming
squarely to grips with the problems of treaty violation, it seems likely that
national courts will increasingly construe internal law so as to avoid risks
of conflict with E.E.C. Treaty obligations." 4
Thus, the general provisions of article 3 of the treaty establishing the
E.E.C. include a directive, that Community activities should embrace the
"approximation of... municipal law to the extent necessary for the func-
tioning of the Common Market." Articles 100- 102 set forth a broad
authorization for direct intervention by institutions of the E.E.C. to recon-
cile the legislative and administrative rules and regulations of Member
States when: (a) the existence of a disparity in the legal system of Member
States directly affects the establishment and functioning of the Common
Market, or (b) distorts conditions of competition within the Common
Market.
According to Article 100, the Council, acting by unanimous vote on a
proposal of the Commission, and after previous consultation with the
Assembly and the Economic and Social Committee, shall issue directives
for the "Approximation of Law." (The title of chapter three of the Treaty).
The measures utilized by the various Member States to achieve the
intended result may vary in form in accordance with the differences in the
constitutions of Member States and in their various laws ratifying
the E.E.C. Treaty. Thus, the German law of ratification of July 27, 1957,
imposes a duty on the Government to inform the Chamber of every
provision of the Community in relation to which active measures of com-
pliance will need to be taken, and in Italy, in the absence of special
ratifying law, the directives may be complied with, either by a special law
passed to that effect, or by delegation by law of the necessary powers to
the Government.
The aims to which the "harmonizing" (or "approximation"-
"rapprochement") activity are directed by article 10 1, have regard solely to
those disturbances of competitive conditions in the E.E.C., that are de-
scribed as "specific distortions" in the Rules Governing Competition, e.g.,
in exclusive distributorships, mergers, resale price maintenance and so on.
Whenever a Member State proposes to pass a new law or modify an old
one so that a "distortion" is to be feared, it is bound to consult the
Commission in order to discover probable repercussions on the Common
Market. Then, after consulting with other Member States, the Commission
will, in turn, recommend the best measures to avoid such a distortion.
4Ebb, The Grundig-Consten Case Revisited: Judicial Harmonization of National Law
and Treaty Law in the Common Market 115 PENN. L. REV.855 (1967). Feld, The European
Common Market and the World (1967).
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Sometimes it may occur that a Member State will not recognize the full
consequences of its legislative proposals, or not foresee the possible reper-
cussions on the competitive conditions in the Common Market.5
Thus, an outstanding work of comparative law originated from the Com-
mission's need to obtain an "opinion," with respect to the laws of unfair
competition of the six Member States of the E.E.C. It was a happy
accident that the Max Planck Institute for foreign and international patent,
copyright and trademark law of the University of Munich, was indeed the
most competent organization for that purpose, and the Commission re-
quested just this institute to render an opinion on the law of unfair com-
petition in the Member States of the E.E.C. This was accomplished in six
volumes, which deserve in every respect the highest praise. It is regrettable
that the work is incomplete insofar as it covers only the laws of the six
Member States, and none of the not so thoroughly developed laws of the
Anglo-Saxon countries.
It is remarkable that Professor Ulmer, the editor of the six volumes,
almost enthusiastically comes to the conclusion that the dogmatic basis of
the six laws is the uniform concept of the term unfair competition, the close
relationship between the law of unfair competition and the law of trade-
marks,6 and the common root of the law of unfair competition and the
cartel (antitrust) law.
In the third chapter of the first volume we find the discussion of the
interests which are protected in the law of unfair competition, and it is
properly emphasized that it was especially the German law which, through
its injunction, was enabled to protect not only the interests of the individual
competitor, but also the collective interests of the trade as a whole ("Ver-
bandsklage") and the consumer interest as such.
In the latter respect, American law created a protection through the
Federal Trade Commission, which has preponderantly the task of pre-
venting false and misleading advertising. Since the Anglo-Saxon law is not
subject matter of the opinion, it was correct when Ulmer said: "The courts
are strictest in Germany, the mildest in Italy. The other countries are in the
middle with an inclination towards Germany." The law of the United
States Federal Trade Commission is very similar to the law in Germany
("class action").
5A. Grisoli, The Impact of the European Economic Community on the Movement for
the Unification of Law, 26 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 418 (1961).
6Germany and the United States agree in the familiar axiom that the law of trademarks is
only a part of the broader law of unfair competition. RG2 120, 328 and numerous other
decisions of the German former Supreme Court; U.S.A.: Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 et al.
International Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 4
858 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
I. Industrial Property and Unfair Competition
Articles 222 and 234, similar to Article 36, declare that the treaty "shall
in no way prejudice the system existing in Member States in respect of
property," or "rights and obligations arising out of treaties," such as the
Paris Convention. Article 90 does not refer directly to industrial property,
and merely prohibits the exploitation of "special or exclusive rights" con-
trary to rules like those in Articles 85 et seq.
Finally, Article 106 refers to "invisible transactions," which may not be
used to introduce new restrictions on transfers of capital or payments.
(This article refers to Annex III to the Treaty which mentions, inter alia,
authors' royalties, patents, designs, trademarks and inventions and the
assignment and licensing of such rights).
On the other hand, the existing systems in Member States are imme-
diately prejudiced if the Common Market, intending to harmonize the laws
of the six Member States, creates special laws with respect to trademarks,
patents, know-how and unfair competition. Moreover, it is clear under the
decisions that the law-enforcement authorities of the Common Mar-
ket-the Court of Justice and the Commission-will not sanction misuse of
trademarks and patents in violation of Articles 85 and 86. Such protection
against misuse, for which the United States antitrust law is an important
prototype, will not be hampered by Articles 36, 222 and 234; the ex-
emption expressly relates to Articles 30 to 34 only, which deal with
quantitative restrictions imposed by Member States on imports and do not
pertain to Article 85.
II. "Unfair Competition" as a Legal Concept
A recognition that the meaning of the term "unfair competition," in a
technical sense, should be equivalent to the meaning ascribed to it in
common parlance will neither clarify its meaning as a legal term nor allow
its use as a legal standard. Nor does clarification result from embellishing
the term with statements that unfair competition "consists of selling goods
by means that shock judicial sensibilities"; 7 or that the law of unfair
competition is "but a reaffirmation of the rule of fair play."
It aims to effect honesty among competitors by outlawing all attempts to
trade on another's reputation-"it gives the crop to the sower and not to
the trespasser"; 8 or that "fair competition is 'open', 'equitable,' 'just' com-
petition." 9 It serves no useful purpose to evade the task of clarification by
7Margarete Steiff, Inc. v. Bing, 215 F. 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
8Bard-Parker Co. v. Crescent Mfg. Co, 174 Misc. 356, 20 N.Y.S.2d 759 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
9 United States v. National Garment Co., 10 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Mo. 1935).
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positing a "more 'liberal' or 'modern' concept of unfair competition, and
holding that there may be unfair competition, even absent actual or poten-
tial competition.' 10
We must therefore evolve a legal standard stable enough to offer the
courts a guide, and yet flexible enough to permit the influence of justice and
an inherent sense of fair play. The judge must be free to deal with an
infinite variety of facts and circumstances without being bound by any hard
and fast rule. Otherwise, it is mere lip service to a sound principle to say
that courts are able to master cases which are novel, and that "the fact that
a scheme is original in its conception is not a good argument against its
circumvention.""
The plastic concept of unfair competition allows a broad interpretation
without being too indefinite, even though, as one court expressed it, some-
times "one can feel the unfairness better than one can express it from the
bench."' 12 Is the judicial process or legislative action better designed to
solve competitive conflicts? The question is not an idle one considering the
doubts of many able jurists with respect to the ability of the common-law
courts to create, for instance, new property rights.
It is noteworthy that even such traditional statutory law countries as
France and Germany, developed an admirable corpus of decisional law in
torts and unfair competition, a common law comparable to, and as satisfac-
tory as, that of the traditional common-law countries. The statutory device
of European law is a general clause, a norm similar to that of Art. 10 bis,
paragraph 2, of the Paris Convention.
An E.E.C. law of unfair competition is therefore not urgent and perhaps
not even necessary. Article 10 bis of the Paris Convention is, like all
blanket norms, the basis for judge-made law. Broad discretionary authority,
on the basis of the general equity power, is conferred on the courts because
the concept of unfair competition "does not admit of precise definition, but
the meaning and application of which must be arrived at by ... the gradual
process of judicial inclusion and exclusion."' 3 "It vests," as it was properly
said,' 4 "in the courts' wide judicial discretion in case-by-case adjudication
of new private claims that press for recognition and legal security as the
economic, technological and cultural life of society progresses."
When it is possible to create judge-made law in a nation with as many
different parts as the United States, it should be relatively easy to harmo-
i°Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. Supp. 509, 512 (C.C.A. 6th, 1924).
"American Philatelic Society v. Claibourne, 3 Cal.2d 689, 698, 42 P2d. 135 (1935).
12Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Champion, 23 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1938).
"3Federal Trade Commission v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304, 310- 312 (1934).
14Oppenheim, The Judicial Process in Unfair Competition Law: A Perspective and a
Focus, 2 P.T.C.J.R. & Ed. (Conf. Supp.) 116.
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nize the standards of commercial honesty and fairness of the six Member
States, with similar cultural backgrounds and the same experience with
international conventions. Therefore, the development of a supra-national
law of unfair competition in the Common Market can be safely left to the
Court of Justice and the Commission.
III. Trademarks
Certain European countries have attempted to adapt their trademark
laws to the new E.E.C. concept. Italy and France, for example, have
already adopted a uniform classification-of-goods system, and are presently
planning a treaty under which the deposit of a trademark in one country
will be deemed to have been made in both. The three Benelux countries
have prepared a uniform trademark law; a combination of the proposed
Benelux bill, and some provisions of British and Canadian law could
perhaps be used as the prototype for an E.E.C. law.
Progress has also been made within the E.E.C.; serious consideration is
also being given to an E.E.C. mark. Although a proposed European trade-
mark law 15 was drafted by a committee under the Chairmanship of Presi-
dent de Haan of the Dutch Patent Office during 1962 and 1964, it has not
yet been promulgated. In essence, it would establish a uniform E.E.C.
trademark law for the supra-national territory of the Common Market
premised upon the universal principle with respect to intercountry relation-
ships.
It would provide for centralized registration in a European Trademark
Office, except for certain absolute prohibitions on registration. Publication
would follow, and provision would be made for the examination of prior or
better rights in the crucible of an opposition proceeding, with respect to
European marks and all national marks and other designations, thus grant-
ing meaningful and far-reaching incontestability to any registered E.E.C.
mark. Its owner would be granted a "positive right to use"; there would be
some modification of the right to prohibit parallel imports and cancellation
for non-use after five years.
Future proposals may find it necessary to adapt the proposed European
law to the Madrid Arrangement for the international registration of marks,
and to respond to the Council's wish for "harmonization of such laws,
regulations and administrative rules of the Member States as directly affect
the establishment or operation of the common market."' 6
'
5 Froschmaier, Progress Toward the Proposed Conventions for a European Trademark,
6 IDEA 483 (1963).
16 Art. 100; also Art. 3(h).
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The need for a single Common Market trademark law is not presently as
immediate as the need for a uniform system to protect trademarks. Without
such a system, trademarks cannot be assured of comparably equal treat-
ment in all Member States, and conflicting rights may arise in the same
mark. To encourage the free flow of goods and the economic integration
visualized by the Common Market, it would seem propitious to put spurs
to the effort to establish a uniform trademark system.
IV. Antitrust Law
1. Special Character of the ECM Antitrust Law
As experience has taught, especially in the antitrust field, broad prin-
ciples of law are easier to express than to apply in particular cases; we
have also learned that, in course of time, judge-made law must be created
to implement and enforce those broad principles. In this respect there is
essentially no difference between common-law countries and those with
statutory traditions. The classical distinction between common-law coun-
tries and countries with statutory traditions has gradually disappeared.
One of the most important events in modern law occurred when Article
1382 of the French Code Civil created a carte blanche, like Article 10 bis
of the Paris Union, for the law of torts and directed courts to decide cases
on the basis of experience and morality. This was the beginning of the
common law of Europe. Many countries followed suit, e.g., German Law
Against Unfair Competition § 1, Swiss Civil Code Article 1.
True, under Article 87, the Council of E.E.C. is authorized to promul-
gate regulations with respect to Articles 85 and 86, but how will they be
construed and enforced? There is probably no area within the purview of
Articles 85 and. 86, in which an attorney could venture a prediction upon
which his client could confidently rely.
One readily recalls the excitement generated by Timken, pertaining to
international market divisions and ancillary trademark licensing agree-
ments,' 7 and by Guerlain, holding an international distribution agreement,
to be in violation of the antitrust laws and the "spirit" of the Tariff Act, and
thereby making the sales organization of an international concern fair game
for international price cutters. 18 In like context, one can cite the confusion
created by conflicting judicial interpretations of the doctrine, that a paten-
tee violates the antitrust laws if he exploits his patent by artificially ex-
panding the scope of the patent grant through price-fixing, licensing or
exclusive dealing agreements, and the like.
'
7Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
18United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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The antitrust law of the Common Market, as compared with the antitrust
laws of the United States and of the European nations, is a hybrid. Al-
though its heritage could be attributed, in one sense, to the United States
experience, in another it could be just as validly traced to the German law
against restraint of competition. In reality, however, the two developments
were essentially inconsistent. American law had a purpose which was not
only economic but political and German law necessarily reflects its car-
tel-oriented ancestry.
There is a considerable difference between the respective antitrust-law
goals of the Common Market and in the United States. The, primary goal of
the Common Market is the development of a customs union, by the
abolition of customs duties within the Community with the final result of an
economic and political union. At its core, union is the impulse for, and the
underlying theory of, Common Market ideology. The United States is, in
fact and in law, already a union of its component states.
In a certain sense, the concept of union was not entirely unfamiliar to
the Member States of Common Market. They already had two things in
common: their adhesion to the Paris Convention and their membership in
the Madrid Arrangements. However, those unions were of no value with
respect to the formation of supra-national law. The guiding theory of the
Conventions was and still is nationality, each country protects trademarks,
be they the trademarks of its own nationals or- by way of reciprocity -the
trademarks of nationals of member countries, according to its own national
law, in practice and procedure. The primary benefit of the Conventions is
that the member countries thereby became adjusted to cooperation in an
international atmosphere.
The Common Market is presently, at best, an emerging economic union,
a unified interstate market among the member states. Assessed against the
values of the motivating union concept, the preservation of competition is a
secondary value. True, the premise that competition is a healthy stimulus
to economic development is the gift from the United States. Accordingly,
Article 85(1) of the Treaty declares that all acts "designed to prevent,
restrict or distort competition within the Common Market or which have
this effect," shall be prohibited "as incompatible with the Common Mar-
ket," or, more pointedly, with the perfection of the merger and integration
of the several national markets within the Common Market.
The Rome Treaty, which is more the constitution than an economic law
of the Common Market, is more modest in its expectations from free
competition, it contains no per se violations, and its Article (85)3 posits a
very reasonable statutory "rule of reason." The Treaty is not predicated
upon any abiding or implicit belief in the merits of free competition, but on
a political ideal which grew out of the history of the participant states.
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Nevertheless, it is the hope of the Member States of the Treaty, and
especially of those who have been charged with the administration of the
Common Market, that the successful development of the customs union
will insure more competition between the business firms within the E.E.C.,
and more competition with those firms in countries outside the E.E.C. To
this end, all artificial or government aids, differences in taxation or in laws
affecting business should be eliminated.
Conversely, all artificial obstacles to mergers should be removed to
counteract the dominant position of a competitive and financially powerful
firm from a non-member country. The aims of the E.E.C. competition
policy are as follows: (1) Opening domestic markets by eliminating all
measures that are equivalent in effect to customs duties or which otherwise
restrict trade, such as licensing systems, discrimination arising from gov-
ernment monopolies, and market-sharing cartels; (2) Abolition of all in-
ternal frontiers and frontier controls, especially by eliminating different tax
burdens imposed on enterprises in the Member States; (3) Elimination of
distortions of competition resulting from State aids; (4) Elimination of
distortions of competition which arise from differences in the laws of the
Member States affecting business, such as tax laws, corporation law, patent
and trademark laws and laws against unfair competition. 19
In this context, it is apposite to note that the most important decision of
the Commission of the Court of Justice in Grundig-Consten 20 defended
the idea of the union. That decision protected its goals against private
forces which, by restrictive agreements, sought to negate the effects of the
lowering of trade barriers between the member countries. It held that any
act "incompatible with the idea of a Common Market"-the territorial
division of markets-"constitutes a division between one national market
of an E.E.C. country from the market of another E.E.C. country [which
will] be prohibited in almost every case and.., dispensation under Article
85(3) will be very difficult if not impossible to obtain." It was even a
surprising thought of the Commission that "parallel imports" were consid-
ered beneficial because they served to correct economically unjustifiable
price differences between Member States, thus advancing the goal of
achieving a Common Market.
19Von der Groeben, Competition Policy in the Common Market and in the Atlantic
Partnership, 10 Antitrust Bull 125 (1965); Address to the European Parliament, Strassbourg,
of June 16, 1965 (Publication Services of the European Communities 8158/5/V! 1965/5,
CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 9036).
20Consten and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. E.E.C. Commission, Court of Justice Cases
Nos. 56/64 and 58/64, July 13, 1966 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. 8046. For comments, see
Newes, The European Commission's First Major Antitrust Decision (Grundig-Consten), 20
Bus. LAW. 431, 436 (1965); Fulda. The First Antitrust Decisions of the Commission of the
European Economic Community, 65 COL. L. REV. 625 (1965); Newes. Exclusive Dis-
tributorship Agreements in the Common Market 22 Bus. LAw. 533 (1967).
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The dominant concept of United States antitrust law-protection of the
public interest-also appears in the Common Market treaty. But there is a
decisive difference. The American approach is based upon the assumption
that the public has an interest in the preservation of free competition. The
treaty's concept is a bit more concrete. As noted in Grundig-Consten,
Consten's margin of profit was greatly in excess of the profit margins of
other distributors, and the Commission therefore concluded that con-
sumers would not equitably share "in the resulting profits" as required
under Article 85(3) for the granting of an exception.
2. Antitrust Law and Trademark Law
The possibility of conflict between national trademark law, and the
antitrust provisions of the E.E.C., first became manifest in Grungid. In that
case, it will be remembered, the Commission ordered Grundig and Consten
to refrain from any further use of the Grundig trademark GINT, in a
manner that would restrict "parallel imports" into France-the only osten-
sible purpose for which GINT was used; the trademark-an industrial
property right-was the "legalistic tool" by which the distributor-
Consten -attempted to monopolize a national market for products covered
by the trademark.
The Commission emphasized that the GINT mark was not required to
advise consumers with respect to the origin of the goods-the typical
trademark function-because the GRUNDIG trademark would have been
sufficient for that purpose. As the opinion of the Court of Justice pointed
out, although the E.E.C. Treaty was not intended to affect national in-
dustrial property rights, it did prohibit any use thereof which would be
inconsistent with or contrary to the overall purpose of the Treaty. The
Treaty having been designed to create a unified common market, any
contractual arrangement or agreement involving the exercise of an in-
dustrial property right, in a manner which contravened the purpose of the
Treaty would be violative of the provisions of Article 85.
The Court properly concluded that no trademark use should be per-
mitted to violate the antitrust laws. It is, however, erroneous to assume
that the propriety of a trademark use is to be tested only under the
technical trademark law. Every trademark use must be assessed in light of
the superior law against unfair competition, of which it is a part. No
trademark use can be tolerated if it is designed to implement or effectuate a
pattern of restraint of trade.
(It is, therefore, unfortunate that the majority of the IAPIP (AIPPI)2'
2 1 lnternational Association for the Protection of Industrial Property (Association In-
ternationale pour ]a Protection de la Proprit6 Industrielle).
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Venice Congress of 1969, in its study of the unification of the rights of
trademarks, approached the problem of unauthorized importation of trade-
marked products from the aspect of trademark law only, ignoring the law of
unfair competition).
Perhaps the most famous example is the Timken case.22 In that case,
manufacturers in different countries used the mark to control the channels
of trade, by dividing the world into exclusive marketing areas.
Grundig-Consten posed quite a different problem. The prevention of
"parallel imports" was essentially a stratagem to protect an exclusive
distributor against intrabrand competition and it is highly debatable wheth-
er this is, in fact, an unreasonable restraint of trade. The result might well
depend upon the view of the court in the jurisdictional area-which in the
Grundig case was neither France nor Germany but the Common Mar-
ket- with respect to the power it would be willing to grant a manufacturer
over his distribution system. There are basically two views: one rests upon
the purely technical trademark aspects; the other ignores the trademark
technicalities, and is concerned with the right of a manufacturer of trade-
marked goods to control its distribution to the eventual consumer.
Under the first approach, the argument proceeds upon two correlative
theories-the doctrine of territoriality and the doctrine of "exhaustion." A
national trademark law only grants territorial protection to the trademark
which serves to inform the public of the origin and nature of the trade-
marked goods. Once the goods have been put into circulation, this ex-
clusive right to the mark is "exhausted," "used up," or "consumed," unless
others thereafter tamper with the goods as branded.
The second approach is purely economic. Recognizing that the trade-
mark owner, by advertising, has effectively established the goodwill of his
trademark, and that such goodwill may be essential to the sales success of
"his" dealers. Therefore, the owner should be entitled to have his efforts
rewarded by reserving such control as he deems advisable over the dis-
tribution of his goods, even to the extent of fixing the resale price thereof to
the ultimate consumer.
The first view is too narrow; it is confined to the trademark problem, and
to the fact that the manufacturer misused his trademark to secure some
international protection for his distribution system. The legal problem is
merely that of trademark infringement, and it is axiomatic that no remedy
will lie if the public is not deceived. But that is not the essence of the case;
the essence is to protect the distributors of the manufacturer against com-
petition.
22Supra, note 17.
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The doctrine of territoriality is equally superfluous; in a long line of
European cases the problems of parallel imports were considered under the
doctrines of territoriality and universality. The doctrine of exhaustion is
not only superfluous but very debatable.
The second view puts the trademark issue into proper perspective by
treating it as incidental; the more significant issue is whether the manufac-
turer has a reasonable basis for the protection of his distribution system,
and this is predominantly an antitrust-law problem. The manufacturer may
attempt to do so by the use of a trademark, or by invoking the doctrine that
the parallel importers' interference with his underlying contractual relation-
ship with his distributor, constitutes unfair competition. In Grundig, the
Court was unduly influenced by the fact that the consumer was hurt
because he could not buy Grundig products at a price lower than that
charged by Consten. This should not have been decisive; the products
were not necessities and the manufacturer was not a monopolist.
In similar vein, the legality of a resale price-maintenance system should
not be viewed from its trademark aspects. In Grundig, the Commission
held such price fixing to be incompatible with the underlying purposes of
the Common Market. Here we have a genuine conflict between the law of
the Common Market and the law of Member States, in which resale price
maintenance has been sanctioned.
The Commission's view was not surprising; a similar trend is evident in
the United States, although resale price-maintenance is legal and enforce-
able in many states. Prior to Grundig, the German Supreme Court23
assumed that resale price-maintenance would not be violative of Article
85(1).
Whatever the economic and political merits of the E.E.C., the science of
comparative law in the field of unfair competition owes to the Rome Treaty
and the Commission's initiative a work of supreme excellence.
2 3Bundesgerichtshof, Judgment of June 14, 1963, 40 BGHZ 136 in re Braun Electric
Razors, 3 COMM. MKT. L. REV. 59 (1964).
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